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Conversion of Consciousness 
as Principle of Morality
A Conversão da Consciência como 
princípio da moralidade
* Konrad Utz
Abstract: Kant shows that a fundamental theory of normativity 
and morality can give neither an explanation nor an explication of 
normativity, but can only articulate and render explicit its origin. It 
can do so by indicating the place or topos and the turn or trope of its 
originating. According to Kant, the topos of normativity is the will qua 
practical reason and its trope is the general, typically instrumental 
use of this reason, i.e. reflection. The trope of the origin of morality is 
autonomy, i.e. practical reason turning on itself and thus becoming 
pure practical reason, thereby establishing its own form as law: the 
categorical imperative. Consequently, fundamental ethics serves two 
functions (if it is indeed successful): formally, it provides evidence for the 
originality or authenticity of morality; materially, it gives a criteriological 
principle for the content of morality. The article argues that Kant was 
right in his view of the foundation of ethics, but was wrong in the 
manner in which he met the requirements thus established. The topos 
of normativity and, consequently, of morality cannot be reason, but 
must be consciousness or, more precisely, (actual) knowledge de se; 
and its fundamental trope cannot be reflection (and then autonomy), but 
must be what can be described as a conversion of consciousness. This 
conversion can be identified with philein in the sense of Aristotle. It has 
four different aspects: desire, cognition, benevolence, and recognition. 
When philein is reciprocal and lived, philia ensues. Friendship (in the 
broad sense of Aristotle) is then described as the topos of the origin of 
Normativity and Morality. 
Keywords: Aristotle. Friendship. Kant. Normativity. Morality.
Resumo: Kant mostra que uma teoria fundamental da normatividade 
e da moralidade não pode dar nem uma explanação nem uma prova 
da normatividade, mas apenas pode articular e explicitar sua origem. 
* Doutor, Professor da Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza. <konrad.utz@gmx.net>.
Ela pode fazer isso indicando o lugar ou o topos e a virada ou a trope 
de seu originar. Conforme Kant, o topos da normatividade é a vontade 
enquanto razão prática e sua trope é o uso geral desta razão que 
tipicamente é instrumental, no sentido da reflexão. A trope da origem 
da moralidade é a autonomia, i.e., a virada da razão prática sobre si 
mesma, tornando-se pura neste ato. Nisso, a razão prática estabelece 
sua própria forma como lei para si mesma, na forma do imperativo 
categórico. Em consequência disso, a ética fundamental serve duas 
funções (quando for bem sucedida): formalmente, ela fornece evidência 
da originalidade e autenticidade da moralidade; materialmente, ela 
fornece um princípio criteriológico para o conteúdo da moralidade. O 
artigo argumenta que Kant estava certo em sua visão da fundamentação 
da ética, mas estava errado com relação à maneira como ele tentou 
cumprir as exigências estabelecidas. O topos da normatividade e, em 
consequência disso, da moralidade, não pode ser a razão, mas precisa 
ser a consciência ou, mais exatamente, o saber de se (atual); e sua 
trope fundamental não pode ser reflexão e, depois, autonomia, mas 
precisa ser o que pode ser descrito como conversão da consciência. 
Essa conversão pode ser identificada com o philein no sentido de 
Aristóteles. Este “amar amigável” tem quatro aspectos diferentes: 
desejo, cognição, benevolência e reconhecimento. Quando este philein 
for recíproco e estiver continuamente vivido, nasce a philia, a amizade 
(no sentido amplo de Aristóteles). Essa é descrita, consequentemente, 
como o topos da origem de normatividade e moralidade.
Palavras-chave: Aristóteles, amizade, Kant, normatividade, moralidade
Kant on the Foundation of Normativity
G.E. Moore has argued that normative sentences cannot be reduced to descriptive sentences,1 and despite much debate, this has 
been widely accepted by the philosophic academic community. In 
contrast, Immanuel Kant has articulated the even deeper insight that 
consciousness2 of being obliged cannot be reduced to consciousness of 
sentences (at least not simpliciter), no matter if they are normative or 
 
1 To be exact, this is how Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy” is commonly understood. Moore himself 
did not discuss sentences, but the meaning of the word “good”, cf. idem, Principia Etica 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). But this is not important for what I want to 
explain.
2 I use the term consciousness in a broad sense, roughly as that, which we have when we 
are awake or dreaming and which we do not have when being in deep sleep or in coma. In 
Kant, consciousness in this sense is the basic feature of “Vorstellungen” (representations), 
as in: “The representation of an objective principle, inasmuch as it is compelling for some 
will, is called commandment (of reason) …” Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (GMS – 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals; cited according to the Akademie Ausgabe, Berlin 
1900ff), 413. For a more detailed account of my views on consciousness cf. K. Utz, Bewusstsein. 
Eine philosophische Theorie. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2015.
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descriptive.3 The problem is that a sentence per se can inform a subject 
only about something, that is, about things, including other subjects 
and attitudes (whether propositional or not) of other subjects towards 
something. Therefore, any normative sentence can inform a subject only 
of the fact that there is an ought or that somebody means that somebody 
ought … . A subject may even learn that somebody means that she ought. 
But that does not by itself imply that this subject herself consequently 
means that she ought, that she is conscious of being obliged (or that 
she has not only an objective, but also and more importantly subjective 
ought-consciousness). This is evident from the fact that contradicting 
claims can be understood by a subject at (more or less) the same time.
Consciousness of being obliged implies knowledge de se. If I am 
conscious of being obliged, I am conscious of myself being obliged. I have 
practical self-consciousness; I know myself under an obligation (I have 
“subjectual” knowledge de me, different from “objectual”4 knowledge de 
me). Knowledge de se cannot be reduced to other kinds of knowledge (de 
re, de dicto), as Hector-Neri Castañeda5 and others have argued. M. Frank 
has recently presented the discussion in a way that seems conclusive to 
me.6 Nothing can convey knowledge de me to me; it is not information that 
can be passed on to me – or that I could pass on to someone. Therefore, 
a sentence can only be an articulation of my self-knowledge: I can never 
arrive at self-knowledge by acknowledging a sentence and then, by 
means of this, get knowledge de me.7
3 Cf. GMS. The following exposition is based mainly on the Second Section. Cf. also Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft, 64 (KPV – Critique of Practical Reason, also cited according to the 
Akademie Ausgabe).
4 It is necessary to talk in this way, because knowledge de se cannot be object-knowledge in 
the intentional sense – if it was, a problem of identification would arise.
5 Cf., e.g., idem. He. A study in the logic of self-consciousness. In: Andrew Brook, Richard C. 
DeVidi, ed., Self-reference and Self-awareness, Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Bejamin’s 
Publishing Company,  2001,  51-80.
6 Manfred Frank, Ansichten der Subjektivität, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2012, esp. 359-368, 
see also 99-126.
7 Of course, I can receive or accept information „from outside“ into my knowledge de me. I 
can identify myself in the mirror; and I can identify myself as the one someone else is talk-
ing about, especially when she is directing her attention unto me and uses the word “you“. 
But this presupposes that I know how mirrors and how the language in question function; 
and it presupposes that I already have knowledge de me beforehand – information received 
from outside can only inform me about myself if I, myself, link it to knowledge de me which I 
already have. I cannot learn by information I receive that I am myself. And I can only receive 
information as about myself if I already have some contentful knowledge de me to which I 
can link this information – and not just abstract, transcendental self-consciousness. I must 
know, e.g., that I have a body to identify myself in the mirror (though I may be mistaken, of 
course, as to the concrete specifications of my body). I must know (at least implicitly) that 
I am listening, to understand that by using the word “you” the other person is referring to 
me as the (intended) listener. And if I am to understand that, e.g., “everybody still!” should 
include myself, I must beforehand (at least implicitly) know myself to be somebody: to be an 
individual that may fall under the extension of “everybody”.
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The primary form of practical self-knowledge is, of course, volition or 
volitive consciousness. Prescriptive sentences can only have normative 
meaning in the subjective sense for a subject directly if they articulate 
a volition of the same subject. If I want the sun to shine, I mean that the 
sun should shine, and I myself enforce this ought. If I want to go to the 
theater, I mean that it should happen that I go to the theater (but not 
that I should go to the theater in the sense that I have the obligation to 
do so – it should happen, not I ought to go).
Consequently, all other forms of (subjective) normative consciousness 
must be derivative of volition. All ought-consciousness must formally 
be a want-consciousness turned against itself because volition is the 
original mode of understanding normative sentences. I cannot understand 
normativity if I cannot understand myself “in a practical mode”, that 
is, as willing. So there must be some mediation, some turning or some 
“trope” by way of which my own volition is turned “against me”. This 
trope is typically the expectation of sanctions. We accept prescription 
as something we (subjectively) ought to do, because we expect to be 
rewarded if we do as it prescribes and/or to be punished if we do not do 
so. It does not matter who will effect these consequences nor by which 
causality: whether it is another subject (a human being, a community, 
a god etc.) by means of her will and powers or whether it is nature by 
means of natural causality. Of course, “turning” my own volition in this 
way “against me” implies the use of practical reason. I conclude that I 
should do this because I want that, understanding (the premise that) I 
only can obtain that if I do this.8
That is, my own practical reason tells me to do something I do not 
want to do (e.g. renounce sweet food and drink) in order to obtain 
something I want (e.g. to be slim). The resulting consciousness is ought-
consciousness precisely because it prescribes me to do what I do not 
want. Consequently, noncompliance is possible: I cannot, e.g., resist 
the cake offered to me despite knowing that I should not eat it. It is 
obvious to Kant that all external prescription can be turned into ought-
consciousness only in this way, i.e. by instrumental practical reasoning.9 
Ought-consciousness can only arise within volitional consciousness by 
 
8 Cf. GMS 444: “I should do something because a want something else”.
9 This is obvious from the fact that, according to Kant, there are only three forms of imperatives 
(Kant evidently uses this term not in the grammatical sense, but in the phenomenal: as that 
which a subject, within her consciousness, accepts a practically binding. Of these three, the 
only the first two present prescription which do not origin from the subject herself (from her 
pure reason). However, these prescriptions (the first premises in the practical syllogism) do 
not bind by themselves, but only under the condition of the second premise which is subjec-
tive and articulates an immediate volition or an “inclination”, in Kant’s terminology. Cf. GMS 
413-419, 444; KPV 20.
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turning a subject’s volition against itself. To put it differently, volitional 
consciousness is the topos of ought-consciousness;10 and the reflection 
of volition “upon itself” through practical reason is the trope of ought-
consciousness. As such, a fundamental theory of normativity can have 
no other function than that of articulating or rendering explicit the 
topos and trope of volitional consciousness, i.e., of the will (in rational 
beings). There is no explanation of ought-consciousness – because it 
is essentially a form of knowledge de se, and such knowledge cannot 
be reduced to anything else (i.e. to some explanans, no matter what 
specific character this reduction may have); and there is no explication 
of ought-consciousness in the sense of conceptually constructing it out 
of something different than volition and its self-reflection, for instance, 
by analyzing parts that constitute it or by systematizing it into a larger 
whole which determines it (language games, social practices, e.g.) – for 
knowledge de se can only be self-evident inasmuch as nothing but itself 
can inform it of being of the subject in question.11
Kant on the Foundation of Morality
Therefore, any fundamental moral theory can only be an articulation 
or rendering explicit of some special form of the topos of volition and 
its trope – of some special way of volition itself articulating itself in 
consciousness.12
This is exactly what Kant’s moral theory is doing. My contention is 
that most interpreters have failed to understand the most crucial aspect 
of his theory because they expected him (or moral theory in general) to 
do more – and some because they expected him to do less. But one just 
cannot do more (or less) if one wants to develop a fundamental moral 
theory.13 Any theory that does more, that tries to explain or explicate moral 
consciousness, will destroy moral consciousness because if morality is 
reduced to something else or if it is (re-)constructed from something else 
(be it mereologically or holistically) then it ceases to exist.
10 CF. Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics, New York 2008, 116: „… the nature of rational will turns 
out to be the location“ „where we should expect to find the sole source of normativity“.
11 Cf. K. Utz, Quid mihi? Zur Methode der Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant. In: Deutsche Zeit-
schrift für Philosophie 64/2 (2016), p. 218-223.
12 Cf. K. Utz, loc. cit., p. 213-227, 217-218.
13 A fundamental moral theory can be described as a normative theory which aims at basing 
morality as such on a principle (or principles) which it justifies by some form of rational 
argument and which allows to develop moral content or at least to judge the content of 
existing moral systems; or in simpler terms: a theory which argues why morality is, in fact, 
valid and which expounds some way of determining what it obliges to.
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Kant’s rendering explicit of morality starts by claiming that there 
is another possible way or trope of a subject’s volition turning against 
itself by practical reason than by instrumental reasoning. Instrumental 
reasoning starts from some concrete, primary volition or from some 
“inclination” as Kant would call it. It then searches for some law-like 
nexus (of natural causality or social sanction) by means of which it can 
realize this volition. That is, practical reason takes a representation 
of some law(s) and prescribes to act under that law – since the minor 
premise, the volition for the goal, is given. Kant reserves the term “will” 
for this capacity to act under the representation of laws, which he 
identifies with “practical reason” (GMS 412).14
Yet, according to Kant there is another way in which practical reason 
can prescribe to act: it can be non-instrumental. Practical reason turns 
non-instrumental if it does not accept input from outside, i.e. if it does 
not operate under a premise given by inclination.15 But by what means 
can such a turning point take hold? What could function as the trope 
of non-instrumental volition? According to Kant, it can only be the 
turning of practical reason to itself.16 But what does practical reason 
find if it turns to itself, searching for resources to make itself into non-
instrumental volition? Well, it finds its own form: the form to “act under 
the representation of some law”. Practical reason thereby “imposes its 
own form on itself”; it establishes its own form as a law for itself, a law 
under which to act. And this means that the aspect by which practical 
reason was instrumental, i.e. the subjective or motivational principle 
(borrowed from inclination) should take the form of a representation of a 
law, that is, it should be such that it could be a norm which is universally 
and necessarily binding (for a representation of a law is something 
which either is or could become a law).17 This, thus, is autonomy for Kant: 
practical reason establishing itself as a law – and since for Kant the only 
possible normative prescription for myself, as shown above, is practical 
reason, and since practical reason by itself represents only the form to 
act under the representation of (some) law(s), autonomy is nothing but 
14 To be precise, Kant in GMS 412 uses the definite article “… under the representation of the 
laws”, because he talked about laws immediately before. However, the parallel GMS 427 
(“… some/certain laws”) makes it clear that Kant does not speak about the law of morality 
or any other specific law here, but about laws in general. Cf. also KPV 32. For exegetical dis-
cussion of the passage see Pierre Laberge, ‘La définition de la volonté comme faculté d’agir 
selon la représentation des lois (GMS: 412)’, in O. Höffe, Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar, 4th edn (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2010), 83-96. I 
basically agree with his exegetical conclusion (90f). 
15 Cf. GMS 419-421.
16 Cf. GMS 444.
17 Cf. KPV 31: “The will is being thought as independent of empirical conditions, that is as pure 
will, if it is thought as determined by the pure form of the law …”
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practical reason’s establishing its own form as a law for itself.18 The 
outcome of this is articulated by the categorical imperative: I should 
act in such a way “that I a can also want that my maxim [the subjective 
principle of my will] should become a universal law”.19 And this is the 
principle of what we call “morality”. To summarize, according to Kant the 
topos of the origin of morality is volition in the form of practical reason; 
and the trope from which it originates is autonomy in the literal sense 
of the word in Greek.20
Note that this does not explain why we should be moral.21 Such an 
explanation would lead into an infinite regress of oughts, since it would 
invite the question why we ought to accept the duty to be moral – and 
so forth. It should also be highlighted that this also is not an explication 
of how moral sentences are constructed in our mind (or, even worse, 
in language). Such mental content would never, in itself, constitute 
obligation, since, as mere sentences, it still would have to be connected 
with knowledge de me which cannot be imparted by sentences (see 
above). I could say: “O look, there is sentential mental content originating 
in my mind which demands me to obey it unconditionally. That is very 
interesting! Kant explains me, how this happens. That is more interesting 
still! – But what has this got to do with me?! After all, there is a lot coming 
up and going on in my mind. So let us just go on with that sweet immoral 
life I enjoy so much!” A fundamental moral theory can do no more then to 
articulate the origin or the originating of moral obligation which in fact 
is happening. It is a rendering explicit of a fact or of the originating of 
a fact. Kant calls this the fact of reason.22 We know ourselves as morally 
obliged. No moral theory can go beyond that fact.
But that does not mean that a fundamental moral theory has no 
function, that it only informs us what of what we already know. Quite to the 
contrary: in the first place, the rendering explicit of the originating of moral 
consciousness provides evidence for the fact of this moral consciousness 
 
18 Cf., e.g., GMS 444: “The absolutely good will … will therefore … contain only the form of 
willing as such, and it will contain it, namely, as autonomy”. I have explained this interpreta-
tion of Kant in detail in: K. Utz, Quid mihi? Zur Methode der Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant. 
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 64/2, p. 213-227, 2016.
19 I cite the simplest version of the categorical imperative, GMS 402.
20 Cf. KPV 28f; 33: “The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws.” I have argued 
for the exegetical correctness of this interpretation in: Utz, Konrad. Praktische Vernunft in 
der „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 
v. 69/4 (2015), p. 474-501.
21 Cf. GMS 463.
22 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, 31. I cannot enter here into the vast discussion on the 
interpretation of this topic, which is one of the most controversial among scholars of Kant. 
For an interpretation that is close to mine cf. Klaus Steigleder, Kants Moralphilosophie: Die 
Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft, Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, 2002, 102-108.
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as an original fact. That is, it establishes my knowledge de me of being 
non-instrumentally or of being “simply” and thus “unconditionally” 
obliged as authentic knowledge (well, to be exact: as at least possibly 
authentic knowledge – but that suffices totally23). For it could be, and 
many people, beginning with ancient sophists, in fact held that moral 
consciousness is not authentic but really an instrumental ought the 
sanctional premise of which has been forgotten or has been established 
so firmly by education or cultural conditioning that it subsided into the 
subconscious. There is, in each of us, a natural tendency (which stems 
from inclination) to doubt the validity, the purity and rigor of morality, 
i.e. to doubt its authenticity.24 Therefore, it is of utmost importance to 
provide evidence that authentic non-instrumental ought-consciousness 
is possible; and such evidence represents a real foundation of morality – 
not because it bases morality on something else, but precisely because 
it shows how it can arise based on nothing but “itself”, i.e. on nothing 
but its own topos (in Kant: the will as practical reason) and its own trope 
(in Kant: autonomy). In the second place, such a fundamental theory may 
lead us to a formal, criteriological principle of the content of moral norms 
(in Kant: the categorical imperative).25
Philein
In my view Kant is right in establishing what a fundamental moral 
theory is viz. what it can accomplish. But he is in a crucial manner wrong 
in the way he renders explicit the topos and the trope of moral obligation. 
This is where friendship comes in.
The problem is that from Descartes to Kant and even beyond 
philosophers have not clearly distinguished between consciousness and 
thought (or reason). It is indeed correct that practical reasoning prescribes 
to do something else than volition (or, in Kant’s terminology: than 
inclination) originally wanted. But it is not correct that this prescription 
 
23 Kant is not very clear about the question whether (apparent) moral consciousness can be 
non-authentic (there are passages which indicates that he accepts this, others that he does 
not). However, it seems obvious that this can be the case. But if, in case of reasonable doubt 
about the authenticity of my apparent moral consciousness, I can, by means of moral reflec-
tion, establish that this would be what my moral consciousness would really say if it was 
authentic, then I have no reason not to obey it (by the way, this is one pragmatic function 
of moral reasoning and, consequently, of moral theory), i.e. no reason to expel it from my 
consciousness de me.
24 Cf. GMS 404f.
25 Kant formulates the two functions of foundation of morality, viz. articulating its origin (and 
thus its formal aspect, its authenticity) and rendering explicit a criteriological principle for 
its content, in GMS 405: practical philosophy informs common moral consciousness about 
the “fountain of its principle and the right determination of the same”.
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always enters consciousness as an ought. In fact, it often does not enter 
consciousness as anything distinct at all – but as just the thing I want 
to do. If I drink wine, part of that action is obviously instrumental: I lift 
the glass to my lips in order to drink from it. I do not want to lift the 
glass to my lips simpliciter. But it does not even come to my mind that, 
in lifting the glass to my lips, I am doing something different from what 
I (directly) want. In my (conscious) mind, lifting the glass is just part of 
the action that I want and enjoy. Even in cases where there is a distinct 
consciousness of realizing the means, very often this is not an ought-
consciousness. Take a girl that is spotting her friend outside the window. 
She wants to go to her. But to do so, she has to do exactly the opposite: 
she has to go away from her since the door of her room is opposite to the 
window. But the girl is not conscious of doing something she should do 
– but does not want to do – in order to get to her friend, of having to do 
something different than she actually wants to do. No, she is conscious 
of running to the door as part of the action of running to her friend. The 
situation changes when she is far away from her friend and the journey 
to see her is strenuous. In that case she actually will regard the journey 
as something she has to undertake, something imposed upon her by 
her wish to see her friend. Consequently, there certainly is a difference 
between having knowledge de me or self-consciousness as wanting 
to do something and having knowledge de me as being obliged which 
does rest on the difference of ends and means. But it is not reason that 
makes the difference because in many cases practical reason is active in 
prescribing means, but this prescription does not enter consciousness 
as an ought, i.e. as a prescription turned against the primary volition. It 
just amalgamates with that volition. To draw some of the consequences 
of the above discussion, the first point is that the topos of the origin 
of ought-consciousness is really practical knowledge de se or volitive 
consciousness – and not practical reason. Practical reason does make a 
difference and that difference may enter consciousness as an obligation 
turned against primary volition. But it need not do so. Therefore, there 
must be something else that makes the difference. It is important to 
remember that normativity is not just a different content that emerges, 
but a different way of being conscious of some content: as something 
I should do. This latter difference in the way of being conscious cannot 
have its origins in reason, since it does not necessarily emerge with the 
use of reason. But it is properly speaking the difference which is decisive.
Once this is clear, it is immediately evident that even in those cases 
where the prescription of practical reason does turn against the primary 
volition as an ought, this turn is but the second turn. It is the reflective 
turning back on myself in my practical knowledge de me. Since I do not 
K. Utz – Conversion of Consciousness as Principle of Morality
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always and necessarily have ought-consciousness, but very often have 
want-consciousness instead, this reflective turning “back on myself” is 
as such a mere possibility – not a necessity. Consequently, we have to 
ask for its condition of possibility. That condition evidently consists in 
me turning away from my primary volition. This turning-away may have 
various causes, the most typical being that somehow, I am hindered to 
do what I want, or what I do does not have the results I want, or I do 
not know how to realize what I want. In these cases, I ask myself “what 
should I do?”. I am asking for advice from practical reason (be it my own 
reasoning capacity or someone else’s). I am asking for an instrumental 
prescription to realize my primary volition. This turning-away from my 
primary volition, i.e. its suspensio, is the condition of the possibility of 
the second turn, the prescriptive turn of practical reason against primary 
volition. But first, volition must somehow “by itself” or “out of itself” turn 
to something different from itself – in this case to practical reason. “By 
itself” does not mean that this is its free decision. But it does mean that 
it is volition itself which turns, thereby taking a different direction than it 
was originally headed, but which thus continues to be itself in the very 
act of turning to something else. If this entire process was not enacted 
by the primary volition itself, this volition could not serve as the bases of 
the instrumental prescription (as a premise in the syllogism of practical 
reason). But then this prescription could not bind me. If the primary 
volition (in view of an obstacle, a failure, etc.) just stopped instead of 
turning, the result would be frustration – but not an ought-consciousness. 
So the turning away, the turning into a new direction, must really be an 
act of volition itself – even though it need not be (and cannot be, at this 
level) a deliberate or free action.
We therefore have two tasks to accomplish in order to reestablish 
a fundamental ethics after Kant’s failure: we have to go back to 
consciousness as the topos of the origin of moral obligation; and we 
have to search for the basic trope which renders explicit the originating 
of this obligation. For even though reason sometimes is the addressee of 
this turning, it is not so necessarily. Consequently, this turn cannot be 
defined as a “turn unto reason”. 
If, for the moment, we cannot be sure what or who is the addressee 
of this fundamental trope, we should look at the other side. From what 
is this trope turning me away? It is turning me away from the actuality 
of my primary volition, i.e. from my practical knowledge de me. It is “me 
turning away from myself”. Of course, this cannot just mean turning to 
some (other, new) object; for if I am turning to some object, I am turning 
myself towards it – either cognitively or volitionally. No object as such 
can make me turn away from me, for objects are by definition given, 
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and if they enter my consciousness they are given for me. One object 
may make me turn away from another object, but not from myself, from 
my centeredness on myself. It will not change the centeredness of my 
consciousness on my self.
This centeredness can only be “turned” away form itself if it turns to 
another self. And this is what, according to Aristotle, happens in philein, 
in the act of loving.26 The immediate implication of this trope is that 
my volition is oriented onto this Other Self – not only in the sense of an 
object, but in the sense that the volition itself is turned around: If I love 
a friend, I do not only want for me, I also want for her. I wish the good 
not only for me, but also for her. And I wish it for her not instrumentally, 
but for her own sake.27 My volition in fact turns its orientation onto the 
Other Self28, the self that I love. I want for this Other Self as a subject, 
subjecting myself, my volitive consciousness, my practical knowing de 
me to her, i.e. to her well-being. This is benevolence.29
Once we understand that benevolence originates from the trope of 
volition turning to an Other Self, we immediately see that it is originally 
quantified and qualified. For the specification of what good I want for 
the other person can only be the specification of my own volition which 
is turned unto her. But this specification of the first or basic volition in 
view of the other person I love is just the good I desire for myself from her 
(according to Aristotle, this good can be: 1. the other person's goodness 
in itself, her excellence or virtuosity; 2. her doing good to me, i.e. her in 
some way having some positive effect on me, i.e. her being pleasurable 
 
26 Cf. NE 1155b30f. Cf. Solokowski, Robert, Phénoménologie de l’amitié. In: J.-C. Merle, B.N. 
Schumacher, ed. L’amitié, Paris 115-135. – In some way, Kantian reason is another self within 
myself – or there are two Selfs within myself, two ego-centers: sensibility (including inclina-
tion) and reason. Of course, this does not work. But it explains why Kant’s theory seems 
plausible at first sight.
27 Cf.  NE ibid. Cf, John Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship. In: Review of Metaphysics 
30 (1976), 619-648.
28 Cf. NE 1169b7.
29 The originating of ought-consciousness out of the use of practical instrumental reasoning as 
described above is then explained as a case of self-benevolence or self-care: instrumental 
prescriptions of practical reason enter my consciousness as oughts exactly to the degree in 
which I enter into a “distance to myself” (typically over time) in which e.g. the “myself” who 
will enjoy the fruits of my action isn’t immediately “I myself” at the moment I have to take 
up the strenuous work. So when I am saving money for my future pension I (typically) cannot 
identify fully and directly with the “myself” I am working for – different from the “myself” 
to whose lips I am raising the glass of wine so that I may drink. On the other hand, I can, of 
course, be selfish “against myself” in this sense – and many people often are: “I do not care 
how much I’ll suffer tomorrow from headache: I’ll get drunk tonight!” Of course, it would 
be necessary to go into more detail about self-care and its various forms to present a full 
moral theory. But the short remarks given here may suffice to show in which way the “ought 
of practical reason” analyzed by Kant can be incorporated into the strategy of foundation 
outlined above.
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for me, be it intentionally or not; 3. her being useful for me to attain other 
goods; and accordingly, there are friendships based on virtue, on pleasure 
and on utility). The volition of this good with its generic, qualitative and 
quantitative specification (and thus limitation) I turn unto the other 
person. Therefore, automatically and without further regulation, original 
benevolence has an inherent measure or criterion: “How I want for myself, 
thus I want for you.” This, of course, is the golden rule or at least one 
version of it (however, not yet in the form of a prescription). Consequently, 
the trope of volition into benevolence inherently generates the golden 
rule (very much in the same way as the trope of practical reason into 
pure practical reason simpliciter generates the categorical imperative). 
Just to give it a name, we can call this the “principle of justice”, viz. in 
the Aristotelian sense of the term as a criterion of balance or equality.30 
With this, the second function we may expect a fundamental moral theory 
to fulfill is guaranteed in principle (only in principle, since we have not 
got yet to the level of Morality; but we already have a criteriological 
principle we will be able to draw upon once we reach there): the function 
of articulating at least some formal or criteriological principle for the 
content of Morality.
Now that we have gotten so far – understanding that the original 
trope which opens up egocentric consciousness for normativity is turning 
knowingly away from the ego centeredness of my consciousness and 
understanding that it is concrete and actual practical knowing de me 
which is turned away de me unto an Other Self – it seems natural that there 
should be a trope of cognitive consciousness de me which corresponds 
to benevolence as the trope of volitional consciousness de me. And it is 
not difficult to se what this should be: as I know myself as “my self”, this 
trope should make me know the other person as an “other self”. It should 
make me know her “in terms of self” – as I originally, non-inferentially, 
non-intentionally and non-discursively know myself (and only myself) “in 
terms of self”, i.e. by knowledge de me. Now, being a conscious self is 
something I cannot cognize in an object. I can have no cognition of another 
consciousness and thus of Other Selves in the sense of “de se knowings” 
or “egocenterednesses”.31 To know an Other Self is not to cognize her as 
such, but to recognize her as such. If I recognize an Other Self, I turn onto 
her my own mode of being-in-cognition, i.e. of knowing myself implicitly 
and non-discursively as the center of my cognizing, as that unto which 
my cognizing is directed. In philein, I implicitly and non-discursively, non-
inferentially and non-constructually recognize, i.e. I originally recognize 
 
30 Cf. NE V.
31 I cannot even have objective cognition of my own consciousness.
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an Other Self. The “cognitional content” of this re-cognition is her being 
equal to me – not in her objective characteristics which I cognize, but in 
her subjectivity, in her being a self like I am myself, which I recognize. In 
English, we could say: I recognize the Other Self as a fellow – as a fellow 
citizen, a fellow human being, a fellow living being. 
It is obvious that with recognition we have one more original principle 
which our foundational theory of morality may draw upon, that is, 
once we get there. And it also seems obvious that benevolence and 
its inherent principle of justice need the principle of recognition as its 
counterpart. To modify a well-known Kantian formula: benevolence (or 
justice) without recognition is blind, recognition without benevolence 
is empty. Consequently, it is characteristic of philein that both volitional 
and cognitive consciousness or that consciousness in both its volitional 
and cognitive aspect is at once “turned around”, that philein is the trope 
of consciousness as a whole, in its integrity.
Once we understood that it is consciousness in both its volitional and 
its cognitive aspect, which is turned around in the basic, original trope 
of philein, we can coin a term for the structural aspect of this trope. I 
suggest we call it the “conversion of consciousness”.32
It is very important to see that the conversion of consciousness is 
not its inversion. The egocentric orientation of consciousness is not 
substituted by an orientation unto the Other Self. This would destroy 
benevolence and recognition because at the moment my knowledge de 
me is abolished I cannot recognize somebody else as an Other Self – for 
I can only know by means of myself, thanks to my own knowledge de 
me, what it is to be a self. Likewise, I cannot wish somebody well if 
my own will is abolished. It must be my own will which is conversed 
unto the Other Self. Consequently, egocentric volition must persist, as 
well as my egocentric cognition. Therefore, the original conversion of 
consciousness has four aspects: (egocentric) cognition of an Other Self, 
(egocentric) desire for him (as a phileton), (converse) recognition as an 
Other Self, and (converse) benevolence directed unto him. The whole 
of this we can call “philein” in the tradition of Aristotle33 or (with some 
caution) “love” in English. Different from charity or eros, it is the balance of 
desire, cognizing, benevolence and recognition that characterizes philein. 
 
32 I have explained this principle in more detail in: Utz, Konrad. Freundschaft. Eine philosophische 
Theorie. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012, especially 63-105.
33 Cf. once again his definition of philia in NE1155b30f. He hasn’t got cognition in his list, but 
it is obvious that I must cognize someone to love him. And in place of recognition Aristotle 
understands (mutual) unconcealment as the fundamental cognitive aspect of philein. But 
this, in my view, is something much more complex and cannot be the result of the basic 
conversion of the cognitive aspect of consciousness.
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And this is what conversion of consciousness originally is – though one 
or another of its aspects may become predominant afterwards. Note 
also that “love” used in the sense of the conversion of consciousness 
becomes a very broad term. Wherever a relation between subjects is 
characterized by some (even weak) desire, cognizing, benevolence, and 
recognition, there is love.34 In the following, we will call “friendship” love 
which is reciprocated. Consequently, “friendship” also becomes a very 
broad term, as in Aristotle – different from its usage in English and other 
modern languages of European origin. There is or can be “friendship” 
between lovers, family members, citizens, members of communities of 
all sorts and even of humankind. Therefore, the principle of Conversion 
of Consciousness is not restricted to close, personal relations, but 
applies, possibly, to all human relations and even to relations to non-
human living beings. At the same time – in Aristotle as in the theory 
developed here – exclusive, intimate, personal and free friendship (i.e. 
in the sense of the modern usage of the term) is paradigmatic, since 
here the different moments of love are most developed, and most 
balanced.
A Theory of philein as Fundamental Ethics
The theory of the conversion of consciousness is a foundational theory 
exactly in the sense described above: it articulates or renders explicit how 
we can love others. It does not prove that we should love others by way 
of some normative principle; and it does not show that it necessarily so 
happens that we love others by way of some causality. But it does show 
how love, benevolence and recognition can be original or authentic, i.e. 
non-derivative and non-constructive, non-reducible to egocentric volition 
and cognition or to the external force of natural causation (some circuits in 
our brain, mirror-neurons or such things). And the theory of the conversion 
of consciousness offers formal, criteriological principles for developing 
moral content: the principle of justice and the principle of “recognizing 
as equal” or of fellowship.
Of course, we can indicate what occasions love. But these occasions 
do not explain or explicate love. Beauty is a typical occasion for love. 
But I do not love the Mona Lisa even though I find her beautiful. Sexual 
attraction is also a typical occasion for love. But, very unfortunately, 
sexual attraction is not always the origin of benevolence and respect. 
Occasions for love are not explanations or explications of love. Love is 
 
34 Of course, in this usage, love is not a sentiment (though, naturally, it may imply sentiments), 
nor is it selfless.
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“original”. Benevolence and recognition are not reducible to desire and 
(merely descriptive) knowledge.
As in the case of Kant’s reflection of practical reason upon itself, there 
can be no explanation and no explication (in the sense given above) for 
the conversion of consciousness.35 There can be neither descriptive nor 
prescriptive law under which this conversion occurs and which make 
this occurrence necessary or obligatory. Like reasons turning pure in 
Kant, the conversion of consciousness is a fact the occurrence of which 
is irreducible and non-(re-)constructible (out of other things). It is what 
could be called an original fact – an “originally originating” fact. In this 
respect, the conversion of consciousness is no “better” nor “worse” off 
than pure practical reason.
However, the occurrence of the conversion of consciousness or of 
philein is different from Kant’s rational-reflexive turning in that it is clearly 
an occurrence in space and time. It occurs in view of another subject 
(typically a human being, but possibly also some other living being). The 
conversion of consciousness has an occasion (not a cause) in space and 
time. It is not clear where Kant’s reflection of practical reason upon itself 
originates and what occasions it. Since autonomy or freedom belongs to 
the intellectual world which is abstract, non-temporal and non-spatial, it 
seems that its occurrence should take place in this world and, therefore, 
is not occasioned, but simply given (as an original, irreducible fact). 
Yet this appears somehow odd, because practical reason clearly can be 
instrumental or heteronomous, it need not necessarily be autonomous 
or free. But how should we understand this: is reason autonomous 
and heteronomous, free and unfree at the same time? Or are there two 
reasons within one subject one of which is free and the other is not? Does 
reason speak in two tongues, that of morality and that of instrumental 
deliberation? Or are there two speakers within the subject, pure reason 
on the one hand and inclination on the other? But if this is the case, why 
does Reason speak, on the one hand, on its own, and on the other helps 
inclination to articulate its goals and to find the means to reach them? 
How can reason be, on the one hand, a subject, giving commands; and 
on the other a mere objectual instrument used by an inclined Subject? 
Or are neither inclination nor reason the real subject, but the real subject 
 
35 In the following, I’ll compare the theory I want do develop only to that of Kant which I ex-
posed in the beginning. This restriction is first due to limitation of space. But second there 
are in my view very few theories to which the “theory of the conversion of consciousness” 
could be (directly) compared as a foundational theory of ethics, since very few theories follow 
that notion of what Foundation of Ethics is and what its functions are which Kant exposed 
and which I regard as essential. And those few who do fundamental ethics (more or less) in 
the vein of Kant (e.g. Apel, Habermas, Rawls) stick firmly to the Kantian topos of rationality 
(even if in different forms), which I am criticizing.
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is somehow behind or above both and then identifies with either one or 
the other? But then, what governs or motivates this identification? How 
could it be that I should identify, i.e. that I have the duty to identify with 
pure Reason and not with inclination, if duty is something that can have 
its place and origin (its topos and trope) only in reason? – All this seems 
absurd. In my view, it indicates that something is fundamentally wrong 
with Kant’s conception of the topos and trope of moral obligation.
But even if it is not, we still do not know what occasions reason’s 
turning pure in the intellectual world. Note, also, that the form of pure 
reason is aprioristic and hence necessary: Reason’s purity is a necessary 
possibility. But its being in fact pure is not; it is a mere fact, the fact of 
reason. Reason can be instrumental, and it can be non-instrumental; so 
it cannot be an aprioric necessity that it is non-instrumental. We cannot 
deduce or (re-)construct this fact, not even apriori, for this would destroy 
morality. Because of this, it is by no means clear that every rational 
subject should in every instant have morality. We can never be sure 
anyway (not even about ourselves), as Kant points out, if we are hearing 
the voice of pure reason or the voice of self-interest in the disguise of 
morality, using conventional morality as a means (to avoid punishment, 
to gain recognition, etc.). The intellectuality of the fact of pure reason 
does not guarantee in itself that a rational subject in the empirical world 
should always be a moral subject.36 As a result, it does not seem that 
Kant’s intellectual trope of reason turning on itself can guarantee the 
fact of morality in any better way than the conversion of consciousness 
can.37 Consequently, formally the conversion of consciousness gives the 
same “security” to the fact of morality as pure reason would give (if 
“pure reason” was a viable option, which I think it is not). At first sight, 
it may seem that it offers less stability once it has, in fact occurred. 
One is inclined to assume that, somehow, reason cannot forget about 
the fact of its being pure. But, of course, this fact only persists as long 
as reason remembers this fact or as long as it continues to abide by its 
purity. It seems obvious that we cannot forget that we are free once 
we have reached the knowledge (de se) of ourselves being free (which, 
biographically speaking, we clearly have acquired at some time). But in 
the same sense it seems obvious that I cannot forget my philia for another 
 
36 Naturally, this has nothing to do with the question of subjects actually acting morally. Even 
if a subject is conscious of its moral obligation, it can act against it (not by use of its free-
dom, but of its liberum arbitrium or “Willkür” – it is well known that Kant, like many other 
philosophers, distinguishes between the two).
37 I haven’t shown yet how morality originates out of philia; but since philia will be the origin 
of morality according to the theory I propose, the question of the “security” of this origin can 
be discussed already at this stage.
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person (as long as I do not forget that person herself). Naturally, I can 
lose or renounce my friendship to her. But that is an altogether different 
question.
Again, this does not only apply to close, personal friendship. It also 
applies to friendship in the wider sense, to friendship towards family 
members, citizens, humankind and even towards the community of 
living, sentient beings. Once I have, in fact, realized the Conversion 
of Consciousness towards these groups, i.e. once I have established a 
relation of recognition and benevolence towards them, understanding 
them to be my fellows in at least some fundamental sense, this act is 
normatively irreversible. Of course, I can, in fact, disregard them and 
harm them afterwards. But I know that I should not do this.
Of course, the conversion of consciousness is altogether different from 
pure reason with regard to its content: it is directed toward the actual, 
concrete person I am encountering. Therefore, any obligation that may 
spring from philia in the first instance can only be obligation toward 
this individual person. What is more, not only philia as such but even 
the content of benevolence involved in it is actual and concrete; it is not 
aprioristically and universally determined: that good which I desire for 
me from the beloved, I desire for her. That good which I, in fact, receive 
from her, I want her to receive, in fact, from me.38 The obligation of philia 
turns more and more universal or general in the course of one’s individual 
life as also in the course of the “life” or the history of a community and 
of mankind as a whole. There is in fact something like “universal” or 
better “general” friendship – nowadays at least for humankind, if not 
for all sentient living beings. Unfortunately, given space constraints for 
this piece I am unable to demonstrate how this generalization of philia 
works.39
But even without this, it is evident that benevolence has something 
like an “aprioristic minimum”. If I wish somebody “the good for her own 
sake”, I necessarily imply the wish that she is able to receive from me. 
And this of course implies that she should exist – as a receptive, i.e. as 
a conscious being. Therefore, if I wish another person well, I necessarily, 
with this, wish at least that she should live – since life is the empirical 
condition of being conscious. And respecting an Other Self aprioristically 
implies the minimal content of this self having interests and opinions of 
 
38 This is the first, immediate specification of benevolence. In the next step, reflection modifies 
equality of what I want to give and to receive to equivalence. This is one of the processes 
which develop the structures of friendship beyond its first, most basic form, which I cannot 
describe here.
39 For more details, cf. Utz, Konrad. Freundschaft. Eine philosophische Theorie. Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2012, 228-231, 320-326.
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her own, of her having her own egocentrically determined “good for her”, 
and it moreover implies that she is in some fundamental sense equal to 
me as my fellow. And this in turn implies that once I have developed a 
conceptually articulated regard for myself as what I fundamentally am – a 
family member, a clan member, a member of my people, a human being, 
a living being40 – I locate myself within a minimal or basic fellowship 
with all those who are the same as me, i.e. who are equal to me in 
this fundamental regard. Consequently, the theory of the conversion 
of consciousness or of “friendship” is in fact capable of articulating 
“universal” or “general” content, even if the criteriological principles it 
offers are even weaker than the categorical imperative.
But even in this respect, the “conversion of consciousness” is not 
much worse off. Where does the Categorical Imperative get content to 
turn morality concrete? From maxims. Where do maxims come from? 
Kant does not tell, but most plausibly from inclinations, education, 
cultural conditioning etc. – How do the abstract forms of benevolence 
and recognition turn concrete? By the actual encounter with the Other 
Self, by my desire for her and my cognition of her, by living together 
with her, by being conditioned by the community I form with her 
and others. 
Friendship
As explained from the outset, the conversion of consciousness 
is the rendering explicit of the first trope of consciousness. As such, 
it corresponds to volition turning to reason in Kant, i.e. to volition’s 
turning away from its immediate self-execution in simply doing what 
it wants (drinking, eating, walking, scratching, etc. – normally because 
some impediment emerges). Because of this, the primary conversion of 
consciousness does not establish yet the realm of normativity. In Kant, 
it is only the second trope (by my count, he himself does not count 
turning to reason as a distinct act) that constitutes ought-consciousness: 
the reflection of (instrumental) reason back on volition, telling it what 
it should do in order to realize what it wants to do. And it is only the 
third trope which constitutes moral consciousness, i.e. consciousness 
of being unconditionally obliged: the reflection of reason upon itself, its 
turning pure.
40 Note that emancipation from my family, clan, etc. implies that I do not regard my self (any 
more) as fundamentally determined by that community; and this implies directly that fel-
lowship to this community cannot be for me the ultimate level or the ultimate boundary of 
recognition any more. Those who are equals to me, i.e., equal to what I fundamentally am 
(by my own self-regard), cannot be only the members of my respective community any more.
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The simple, basic conversion of consciousness or simple love is not 
conscious yet of being obliged. In basic benevolence I simply and directly 
want “the good for the beloved”; it is my own volition, not something 
which is elicited from me, not a prescription turned against me. My own 
volition has turned away from me; but it has not yet been reflected back 
on me as an ought.
However, there already is a first trace or a foreshadowing of normativity 
in the basic consciousness of love: in executing my benevolence, in doing 
my friend good (for her own sake), I am conscious of doing what I want. 
But I am also conscious of this being right. I have consciousness (literally 
con-sciousness, accompanying awareness) of my action being not only 
subjectively good, but also objectively good. I do not do this action 
because it is objectively good or right, I do it because I want, because 
I want to do the other person well. But that very volition of mine, in my 
own consciousness, has the character of being (objectively) right. Note: 
the good I wish for the other person is subjectively good – not for me but 
for her. But to wish well not only for me but for her, i.e. the orientation of 
my volition on her seems objectively good or right to me. And it seems 
so immediately, “on its own evidence”, not because I thereby obey some 
norm. Given the theory presented above, it is obvious why this should 
be so: since, in the trope of benevolence, volition is turned away from 
its ego centeredness, it is not validated by one’s own ego any more (the 
subject does not want something “because it is good for me” – but rather 
“because it is good for you”). At the same time, it is not yet validated by 
the other subject insofar as this subject becomes the center of volition 
only by the conversion of volition, so it cannot validate this conversion. 
But the benevolent volition is valid (in the consciousness of the subject, 
in its de se knowledge: she knows herself wishing the other well). It 
“continues” its validity “into” conversion – which is just to say that it 
continues volition or that it its volition itself which turns to the Other 
Self. Consequently, since this benevolent volition is not validated by the 
subject any more, its validity stands on its own. And this means: it is 
objective (in the subject’s own consciousness).
There is no other way in which volition could be originally right but 
in its turning unto an Other Self. It could be derivatively right by fulfilling 
some norm. But in that case this norm has to be right. And, as has been 
shown above, nothing can be right for me if it does not originate (directly 
or indirectly) from my knowledge de me – by some trope or other. What is 
more, since benevolence is the basic (volitional) trope of consciousness, 
normativity can only have its origins in this trope, that is, its objective 
validity must spring from that of benevolence. As such, the conversion 
of consciousness or love already displays an aspect of “right”. This 
K. Utz – Conversion of Consciousness as Principle of Morality
596 Veritas  |  Porto Alegre, v. 61, n. 3, set.-dez. 2016, p. 578-602
develops into consciousness of ought when love turns into friendship. This 
happens – according to Aristotle, and I follow him again – when love is 
reciprocated by the beloved and when those loving one another live their 
love by spending time together and by doing things for one another or 
together.41 Friendship, the reciprocation of love, is the topos of the second 
turning or trope by which benevolence turns into ought-consciousness.42
In the course of friendship friends (get to) know each other, they desire 
each other and things from each other, they wish each other well and 
recognize each other. Therefore, if I have a friend, it naturally happens 
that the one I wish well articulates some wish of hers to me. (If this does 
not happen, it means that she either has no desire for me or she does 
not live her friendship with me; in both cases, there is no real, “realized” 
friendship.) Since in my own loving consciousness I am “wishing for her”, 
and since I become conscious of her wish within this consciousness (or 
within this “orientedness” of my volitional consciousness), eo ipso this 
wish constitutes an ought for me in my consciousness. I do not have to ask 
myself, as in the cases Kant refers to, if I want to accept this prescription 
(which the wish of the other person represents to me) into my volitional 
knowledge de me – because of consequences I want or do not want for 
me. Since I love the other person, her wish immediately articulates itself 
in my consciousness as an ought.
This ought is distinct from my primary volition and even from my 
benevolence in that it really comes “from the other”, in that it represents 
a prescription directed at me. It is not any more what I directly and 
spontaneously wish for the other in my own benevolence; it is not what 
I want. Maybe it is not contrary to my own desires. But it does not spring 
from my own volition and thus is, at least in the first place, not what I 
myself want, but what is elicited from me. And this is why it is in my own 
consciousness an ought – but not only an objective one (as Kant would 
have it), but a subjective one, an ought which I know myself to “stand 
within” or to be bound by.
This ought, however, is not unconditioned. It is not conditioned 
by my self interest, for the basis of its validity is my benevolence. But 
 
41 This is the original way of entering into friendship. However, there also is a derivative way 
– derivative in the logical sense, not in the temporal, for most of our first friendships are 
derivative: we are born into friendships or fellowships that have been established by other 
people, like our family, our people, our religious community etc. And we may enter into 
friendships or fellowships concomitantly when the person with whom we’re establishing a 
friendship already has other friendships which, somehow, bear on the friendship we’re about 
to contract (e.g., when one person marries another person, she normally not only enters into 
a new, specific form of fellowship with her, but also with her family).
42 Something analogous happens with recognition. But since my space is limited, I’ll restrict 
myself to benevolence.
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since primary benevolence is always generically, qualitatively and 
quantitatively specified and thus limited, the demand of the other person 
may exceed my benevolence. Everyone knows these cases: typically, I 
first feel awkward, then indignant. This feeling would be inappropriate if 
the other would just have presented me a hypothetical imperative which 
I can obey according to my own preferences, as Kant would have it. But 
this is not the case: I have been wishing the other well beforehand; with 
this I (implicitly) was ready to accept her wishes into my consciousness 
as oughts; consequently, I somehow have “given myself away” to her. My 
indignation is explained by the other person abusing (be it intentionally 
or not) this “license” I have given her beforehand: my readiness to do 
her well. But this means that this readiness was in fact a readiness to 
receive her wishes directly as oughts; for if it was only a readiness to 
accept them on the deliberation if I want to accept them, I should not 
feel offended. I would do nothing else but state that I have come to the 
conclusion that I do not want to accept them.
Such conflict between my benevolence and the desire of my friend 
very often is the occasion to effect the third trope: the turning onto 
friendship itself. In the situation of such a conflict, I typically ask myself: 
“What do I really owe my friend?” Evidently, what I owe her is not simply 
what she desires from me. Just as evidently, it also is not simply what I 
spontaneously desire to give her. To determine what I owe my friend, it 
is not enough to look at her or at me. I have to look at the friendship that 
binds both of us. As explicated (or rendered explicit) above, benevolence 
originally has an objective aspect. It is right – independently of my own, 
primary volition being right or of my friend’s volition being right. In the 
original trope of love, benevolence was actual and situational. But once 
friendship has been established, benevolence and recognition have been 
established between the friends in question. The general structures 
of this establishment we may call the (specific) ethos of (a specific) 
friendship. The objective aspect, which was present in the original act of 
benevolence and recognition, is in friendship instituted and developed 
beyond mere momentary presence. It is not objectivity as such which 
is established by friendship and revealed by the “third trope”, but its 
independent subsistence beyond a mere aspect or momentum of my 
(conscious) actuality.
In asking what I owe my friend, I turn to the objective reality of our 
friendship and its ethos, the objective reality of the concrete, specific 
benevolence and recognition we established between us. This objective 
reality may not and need not be real and objective beyond my and 
my friend’s consciousness of it. We need not stipulate a metaphysical 
reality of friendship. But for the friends, in their consciousness, in their 
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knowledge de se, their friendship has objective reality: it actually binds 
them (both in the descriptive and normative sense), it is an objective bond 
between them. Friends may dissolve their friendship. But as long as it 
lasts, they (in their own consciousness) objectively owe certain things 
to their friends. As a friend, I know myself to be obliged not only by my 
friend, but by our friendship.
With friendship, we have reached the level of objective, non-conditional 
(that is: not dependent on subjective conditions) normativity. Have we 
also reached morality? That depends on what we take morality to be. 
According to the theory developed here, there is no absolute, aprioristic, 
universal system or doctrine of morality beyond the ethe  of concrete 
friendships – including, as indicated, wider friendships in the form of 
families, peoples, states, religious and other communities, and, finally, 
the fellowship of all human beings or even all living beings. Morality 
is nothing else but the objective, ethical aspect of the friendships and 
fellowships I know myself bound by. This aspect often differs from what 
I egocentrically desire from my friend or what I desire to do together with 
her. But it also sometimes differs from what my spontaneous benevolence 
or sympathy makes me want to do.43 
Since we normally have many friendships on different levels44, and 
since all of them have an aspect of morality, there is the possibility of 
genuine moral conflict. According to the theory developed here we 
must accept the tragedy of moral conflict as part of the contingency of 
our human existence. However, it rarely happens. The conflicts which 
may arise between demands of different ethe  very seldom are, in fact, 
aporetic. Normally we know what we owe to whom and which ethos 
is the ultimately binding one in which context – and by no means have 
the claims of closer friendships always priority over those of wider ones. 
E.g., I owe to my children to care for their school education – and I do 
not owe this care to other children. But I may not use the power I got as 
a public office holder to promote my children’s professional career. This 
would be against what I owe to the community in question. And since 
the public office and its powers are given to me by that community, I may 
not use them to foster other friendships I have. As an office holder, I am 
bound by the ethos of the community which bestowed this office on me. 
And, of course, once again, what friendship demands from me may not 
coincide with what my friend demands from me. My friend may demand 
that, as an office holder, I should give a public contract to her firm. But I 
 
43 E.g., I would very much like to give my friend a glass of whiskey, since he feels so miserable 
without it. But I know that I should not do so, because he is an alcoholic.
44 Once again, I remember that I am using the term friendship in the Aristotelian sense, which 
doesn’t limit it to friendship in the narrow, modern sense.
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know very well that the ethos of our friendship has not got the power 
to support this demand: that it has, so to speak, no authority in the field 
of my duties as an office holder. And, again, what I owe to my friend 
may not coincide with my spontaneous benevolence. E.g., I would very 
much like to give the public contract to my friend (since she desperately 
needs it), but I know I should not do so.
There is no absolute, transcendental super-ethos beyond concrete 
friendships. There is the ethos of our most general, most encompassing 
and most basic friendship or fellowship: the fellowship of all human 
beings or even of all sentient living beings. Some people like to restrict 
the use of the term “morality” to the ethos of this minimal friendship. As 
long as that is a mere terminological decision, nothing depends on it. But 
according to the theory developed here, the ethos of all-encompassing 
friendship, as any other friendship, has been brought forth and has been 
developed in human history, it is not substantially different from them. 
Throughout the centuries, individuals and peoples have broadened their 
comprehension of who belongs to “all of us”, i.e. of the extent of (basic, 
fundamental) recognition; and they have deepened their understanding 
of what goods we owe to all, i.e. of the content of basic, fundamental 
benevolence.
This latter point shows, however, that we do not have to accept 
the ethe  of our friendships simply as given, that we do not have to 
accept anything as “moral” for a given community that the ethos 
of that community says and that we must recognize only those as 
subjects (for its members) who that community regards as fellows. 
There are transcendental, universal and unconditional criteria to judge 
the “morality” of ethe  themselves: benevolence and recognition, justice 
and equal fellowship, mutual care and mutual respect for individual 
freedom. If the ethos of a given community lacks in one of these or even 
violates one of these, it is objectively deficient or “bad” and objectively 
should be changed. We may or even should go beyond a given ethos 
by exactly the same fundamental principle which – in principle – gives 
ethe  their validity: the principle of the conversion of consciousness. This 
means, on the other hand, that the development of our ethe  under the 
transcendental criteria of this conversion is normatively irreversible. We 
cannot decide to go back, e.g., to slave holder society without incurring 
moral guilt: because this modification of our actual ethos (of western 
societies) would not be supported by the principles of recognition and 
benevolence, but, on the contrary, would violate these principles and 
the standard of their concrete realization we already achieved. However, 
the principle of philia does not give us or lead us to any really universal, 
unconditional, definitive and complete ethos which somewhere, somehow 
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eternally exists – maybe in the intellectual world. There is no morality 
beyond friendship. It is not possible to derive or deduce a concrete ethos 
out of the criteriological principles of the conversion of consciousness – 
as it is not possible to deduce actual friendships out of it. Love has to 
take place and friendships have to grow and to form ethe  in real life. But 
the principle of philia is sufficiently strong to take us beyond the mere 
givenness of some (ethical) reality toward its validation or critique. And 
this is all we need.
According to the theory of friendship presented here, what is called 
morality in the traditional and the Kantian sense is a project. There 
is no end to this project and there is not even a definition of its end, 
i.e. of what would be its perfection if we ever reached there. But, 
nevertheless, the development of this project is not arbitrary. It is guided 
or oriented by the principles of philia, the principles of desire, knowledge, 
benevolence and recognition, the principles of equal fellowship and 
individual freedom. The inherent tendencies of this project are towards 
universality and individuality: the tendency to make benevolence wider 
and wider and to make recognition deeper and deeper. These tendencies 
stem from love to friendship itself, i.e. from the desire to “augment” 
friendship by making it wider and deeper. Formally and abstractly 
we can describe the goal of the development of friendship and thus of 
morality as all-embracing (all-benevolent), thoroughly respectful love. 
But this formula is not even clear and distinct enough to serve as a 
regulative idea. There is no other way but to go back from theory to 
life, to strenuous, fulfilling, sorrowful and joyful everyday life, trying 
to make friends, to make ourselves and our friends better, to make our 
lives better lives, to make us better friends and to make our friendships 
better. This implies that we will have to fight violence, disrespect and 
discrimination, sometimes by argument, sometimes even forcefully. A 
foundational theory of ethics is not superfluous; it can give us orientation 
in this. But it cannot substitute life – not even in the achievement 
of morality.
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